2015考研英语阅读英文原刊《经济学人》：钚与米奇鼠

　　Tensions between TEPCO and the government of Naoto Kan have risen since the prime ministerinstalled crisis managers inside the utility’s head office. Privately, officials have suggested TEPCOmay have been slow to use seawater to cool the reactors because it wanted to save its plant—though the company denies this. Publicly, Mr Kan has lambasted the company’s tsunami-preparedness. Koichiro Gemba, a cabinet minister, has left open the possibility that TEPCOwould be nationalised, though this was perhaps to reassure voters in his Fukushima districtthat they would be adequately compensated. Other officials were non-committal about stateintervention, but TEPCO shares have fallen by over 75% since March 11th.

　　东京电力公司和菅直人政府的紧张关系自从首相安插危机管理小队进入电力公司总部就不断升级。东京电力公司出于拯救设备的想法——尽管公司不会承认这一点——而使用海水来冷却反应堆，危机管理组官员私下里建议东京电力公司放缓这种做法。而公开的，菅直人谴责电力公司在预防海啸方面做的不完善。内阁阁员玄叶光一郎保留了东京电力公司国有化的可能性，这也可能是他通过保证给福岛地区选民充分的补偿来安抚选民的做法。其他的官员没有对国家是否会干预发表意见，但是东京电力公司的股价从3月11日起已经下跌了75%.

　　Outside experts say that repeated flaws in the company’s nuclear operations have denuded itsboard of specialists in atomic power. Mr Shimizu is the third successive president to have beenhit by a nuclear accident. “This company is really rotten to the core,” says Kenichi Ohmae, amanagement consultant and former nuclear engineer. He blames TEPCO for storing too muchspent fuel on the site; for placing too many reactors in the same place (there are six in theFukushima Dai-ichi plant and seven in a nuclear complex on an earthquake fault-line inNiigata); and for not having enough varied sources of power.

　　外界专家认为：东京电力公司在核作业方面一而再再而三的错误已经剥夺了他们在原子能方面的专家外衣。清水正孝连续三届成功当选总裁已经被这场核事故终止。管理顾问及前核工程师大前研一认为：“这家公司真是烂到家了。” 他责怪东京电力公司在工地上储存了太多的废燃料;同一地点架设了太多反应堆(福岛第一核电站有六个反应堆，处于地震断层线的新鸿的一个核设施里有七个核反应堆);以及它没有足够多样化的发电方法。

　　But the problems run deeper than TEPCO. The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI)oversees the regulator and is responsible for safety issues. But it also promotes the nuclearindustry. Reportedly, Mr Kan is considering altering this. Nuclear scientists, says Mr Ohmae, aremostly sponsored by utilities, compromising their independence. He describes them as“Christmas-tree decorations” on government safety commissions.

　　但是东京电力公司的问题远不止这些。日本经济产业省(MEIT)监督管理者并对安全问题负责。但是这也推动了核工业的发展。菅直人公开表示要改变这一机制。大前研一先生说，核科学家大多受到电力公司的赞助，这会损害他们的独立性。在政府安委员会里，大前研一先生把核科学家们描述成“圣诞树上的装饰品”

　　The problems compound one another. Taro Kono,of the opposition Liberal Democratic Party (LDP),says there is an “unholy triangle” between METI, itsaffiliated regulator and the nuclear industry. His officenotes that Toru Ishida, a former METI energy official,moved straight into a job as senior adviser toTEPCO. Mr Kono also accuses the media of being inthe nuclear industry’s pocket, because of lashings ofadvertising.

　　问题是一环套一环。日本反对党自由民主党(LDP)成员河野太郎认为，日本经济产业省、其附属机构和核工业之间存在一个“邪恶三角”。 他的团队注意到前日本经济产业省能源官员石田亨直接作为高层顾问进入东京电力公司任职。河野太郎也指出：为了大量的广告收入，媒体也受到了核工业的操纵。

　　Paul Scalise, a TEPCO expert at Temple University’s Institute of Contemporary Asian Studies inJapan, responds that the demonising happens, in part, so that politicians, bureaucrats and theelectorate can avoid blame themselves. He points out that Japan’s embrace of nucleartechnology was a national decision, taken after the 1973 oil shock (Japan imports 99% of itsoil). But after accidents at Three-Mile Island and Chernobyl, local people began to take a not-in-my-back-yard attitude. Utilities and the government responded by offering tax incentives,subsidies and other blandishments. The result was some of the highest electricity tariffs in therich world.

　　日本坦普尔大学当代亚洲研究学院的东京电力公司方面专家——保罗??斯卡里塞回应道：某种意义上妖魔化东京电力公司的事情发生了，这样政治家、官僚和选民就可以避免责怪自己。他指出自从1973年石油冲击(日本进口了99%的原油)之后，日本接受核能技术是一项国家的决定。但是在三里岛核事故和切诺贝利核事故之后，当地居民采取了反对核设施的态度。电力公司和政府对此提出税收优惠、津贴以及其他的利好行为作为补偿。这个结果只是发达国家最高电力税的一部分而已。

　　Yet companies like TEPCO have still struggled to build new plants in the teeth of localopposition, Mr Scalise says. That helps explain why so many of its reactors are on single sites.The company stores spent fuel rods on its premises because there is no consensus on whereelse to put them. Meanwhile, the shortage of capacity means that its margin of excess powerhas been shrinking for 20 years.

　　斯卡里塞说：即便在当地反对派的公然反对下，像东京电力公司一样的公司仍然竭力建设新核电站。这能解释为什么如此多的反应堆建造在同一个地方。公司在工厂里储存废弃的燃料棒，这是因为公司在其他地方安放废弃燃料棒上没有达成共识。同时，容量不足意味着电力公司的电力边际产量将会持续减少20年。

　　Following the earthquake and tsunami, about 28% of TEPCO’s installed capacity, nuclear andnon-nuclear, remains shut down. On March 30th, the government acknowledged the obvious—that it is likely to decommission the Fukushima Dai-ichi plant permanently—and possibly haveto cover it to stop radiation leaking out. That would knock out about 1.8% of Japan’s energycapacity. In a model of bad planning, the country’s power-distribution systems in the eastand west of the country operate on different frequencies, so it is hard to share electricitybetween them. Unless damaged thermal-electric capacity is brought back soon and more smallgas-fired plants are quickly built, months—perhaps years—of energy shortages loom, withcrippling effects on the economy.

　　在地震和海啸之后，包括核设备和非核设备在内，28%东京电力公司已安装的机器停止了工作。3月30日，政府承认：福岛第一核电站有可能会永久的关闭，而且为了阻止核辐射有可能采取掩埋措施。这可能降低日本1.8%的产能能力。在整个规划不佳的模型中，国家东部和西部的配电系统运行采取不同的频率，所以在东部和西部之间分配电力是困难的。除非在短时间内恢复被损坏的火电发电能力或者是建造更多小型燃气发电厂，否则日本将面临数月或者数年的电力缺乏，这会对经济发展产生破坏性的影响。

　　All this will be a reason to judge TEPCO severely. But the crisis is exposing the failure of thenation’s energy policy as a whole. Prices are exorbitantly high. Power generation produces moregreenhouse gases than the government wants. The country has not achieved its goal ofnuclear self-sufficiency by reprocessing spent fuel. And now it has a nuclear disaster on itshands. That is not only TEPCO’s fault. It is Japan’s. If the country wants a more reliableenergy strategy, it will have to start by acknowledging its collective failings.

　　这一切都将作为严厉审判东京电力公司的原因。但是这个危机暴露出了国家在能源政策上的整体失误。电价过分的高。发电厂产生的造成温室效应的气体量超过政府所希望的标准。国家通过对于废燃料的再加工并没有实现其核能自足的目标。现在又发生了核灾难。这不仅是东京电力公司的错，而且是日本的错。如果国家想要一种更稳定的能源政策，那么就应该从承认国家做错了事开始。

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